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Abstract   
Given the pervasiveness of corruption, collusion and nepotism during Suharto’s rule 
(1967-1998), many people assume that the Reformasi era (1998-present) would introduce a new 
wave of liberal democratic values, which would consequently reduce corruption in Indonesia. 
This paper seeks to look at the changes in people’s socio-political incentives to corrupt given the 
changes in political and legal structure, analyzing it in the context of its contribution to 
Indonesia’s socio-economic development. Specifically, it centers on how decentralization has 
affected corruption in the regional districts, legislative, judiciary, and other civil society groups. 
It is the prominence of the corruption issue in the anti-decentralization arguments - in saying that 
transferring autonomy would also transfer along uncontrollable corruption to the local levels - 
that makes this issue worthy to be explored in further details. This paper intends to analyze 
critical junctures of Indonesia’s democratization process and evaluates the status of democracy 
and corruption in Indonesia today. By drawing on general theories on the relationship between 
democratization and corruption, as well as qualitative research conducted by prominent scholars 
on Indonesia’s democratization process, this paper concludes that democratization has led to 
more available channels through which actors in society can abuse their newfound power, which 
has affected Indonesia’s progress in achieving higher socio-economic development. 
Keywords: Indonesia, democratization, decentralization, corruption, economic development  
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Preface 
 As the third largest democracy and the fourth most populous nation, Indonesia has been 
the shining model for a civil and peaceful Islam, and a beacon for democracy in Southeast Asia – 
a region where authoritarian figures have been on the rise. Its geographical features as a wide 
sprawling archipelago with a wide range of ethnicities and customs make it an improbable nation 
to have a thriving democracy, but against all odds, Indonesia has proven that democracy is here 
to stay.  
2014 has been a momentous year for Indonesia as it has made positive strides towards the 
consolidation of democracy as shown through successful third direct presidential and legislative 
elections. It is also a year where democracy was challenged; as the new parliament brought with 
it a contentious political atmosphere with the passing of the bill in the legislative to remove 
direct elections for regional leaders, which was countered with a presidential decree by Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to restore direct elections.  
While it is generally presumed that democratization would bring about political 
institutions that would provide sufficient checks and balances mechanism, as Indonesia goes 
through decentralization, it has not necessarily proved to be successful in reducing corruption 
and delivering better public services to the people. The weak implementation of decentralization 
in Indonesia lacked the mechanisms to constrain the incentives for old and new political elites to 
partake in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic activities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Literature Review  
Since 1999, there has been quite a number of publications written on Indonesia’s 
democratization and decentralization process, though not necessarily with a focus on its 
effect on corruption. Some of the existing literatures focus on how decentralization and 
corruption have affected a specific field (i.e. parliament, local leaders), but this paper is 
beneficial in providing a thorough overview on the decentralization process in Indonesia, and 
offers a more balanced view by considering and synthesizing many viewpoints. It also 
provides a qualitative account of how it has impacted corruption in various actors and sectors 
and socio-economic development in Indonesia. Nonetheless, despite extensive sources that 
were used for this paper, this paper would be stronger and more credible if it had included a 
wider variety of quantitative research and first-hand accounts from fieldwork conducted in 
Indonesia. As such, this paper does not intend to be the most encompassing report on the 
effects of decentralization on corruption in Indonesia, but rather, as a modest starting point to 
give readers a broader view on the issue at hand.  
Firstly, to supplement the paper with theoretical framework on democratization and 
corruption, several sources were used, but the most helpful ones were “Political Corruption 
and Democracy” by Susan-Rose Ackerman, “Decentralization Dilemma” by Chanchal 
Kumar Sharma, and “Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research” by Krisztina 
Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze and “Corruption and Democracy” by Michael Rock. 
Furthermore, some of the most helpful sources on democratization in Indonesia come from 
prominent scholars on Indonesia’s political development, namely the collection of essays 
found in “Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia” edited by Marcus Mietzner and Edward 
Aspinall and “Local Power and Politics in Indonesia” edited by Edward Aspinall and Greg 
Fealy. Additionally, several recent periodicals such as Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia 
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Vol.52 dan 53, and INDONESIA no.96, which included works written by Jeffrey Winters, 
Vedi Hadiz, and Richard Robinson, were also extremely helpful in forming the analysis of 
this paper. There are relatively few quantitative field research works that specifically look at 
democratization and corruption, but findings from “Decentralizaiton and Rent Seeking in 
Indonesia” by Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Public Sector Reforms and Financial Transparency: 
Experiences from Indonesian Districts” by Kristiansen, Dwiyanto, Pramusinto and Putranto  
and “Administrative Overspending in Indonesian Districts: Role of Local Politics” by 
Bambang Sjahrir, Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze” were particularly helpful in 
offering first-hand accounts of how decentralization has impacted corruption activities at the 
local level.  
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Research Methodology 
The study utilizes secondary sources by prominent scholars and political scientists on 
Indonesia’s economic, historical and political development. The secondary sources on the 
general theories on democratization and corruption were made available through JSTOR, 
which was accessed through my home institution, Claremont McKenna College. As for the 
secondary sources on Indonesia’s democratization were purchased online through the 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ website, and lastly, the periodicals (i.e. INDONESIA, 
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, and Contemporary Southeast Asia) consulted were made 
available from the Graduate Institute’s library in Geneva.  
 The secondary sources used were also complemented well by anecdotal evidences and 
firsthand experiences given from the interviewees whom I had a one-hour long discussion 
with. The interviewees’ professional background and experiences also range from professors 
(7), think tank researchers (4), UN human rights officer (1), and PhD candidate (1), who are 
based either in Geneva, Bern, Brussels, Paris, Freiburg (Germany), and Trier. The 
interviewees were found through a meticulous Internet search of scholars who have the 
research and experience in the field of Indonesia’s economic and political development, as 
well as through references from previous interviewees. The wide range and various 
backgrounds of the interviewees would hopefully enhance the depth in perspective and give a 
more balanced dimension of the topics being discussed at hand. Some of the interviewees, 
such as Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, Dr. Christian von Lübke, and Ambassador Linggawaty 
Hakim, also shared their firsthand experiences in training local leaders, which gave valuable 
insight to the paper.   
With regards to ethical considerations, the study did not undergo serious ethical 
considerations, as the topic does not deal with a sensitive group of the population. When the 
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study does discuss rather sensitive issues, which are still debatable, the study hopes to give a 
more balanced perspective and does not include any unresolved facts. Finally, the study also 
respects the privacy issues of the interviewees by informing them of the purpose of the 
research project and refraining from taking notes when they said things were off the record.  
 In terms of limitation, the author was unable to conduct her own field research since 
the project undertaken was completed in less than one month while the author was based in 
Geneva. Thus, the author was limited to other readily available quantitative and qualitative 
research on this field which are accessible online or in libraries in Geneva. Additionally, in 
terms of data used to measure corruption, the author was once again limited in terms of data 
access because some data prior to the downfall of Suharto is unavailable online. Even for 
other data in the period of the post-Suharto era, not all of them are posted online. In terms of 
secondary sources, the author was also unable to consult some other useful secondary sources 
such as “Demokrasi” by Hamish MacDonald, and “Indonesia: Towards Democracy” by 
Taufik Abdullah, “Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance” by H. Ross 
McLeod and “Democratizing Indonesia: The Challenges of Civil Society in the Era of 
Reformasi” by Mikaela Nyman because they are not accessible online and in bookstores or 
libraries in Geneva.  
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Introduction and Focus of the Study 
Early in 2001, after just one and a half years since the downfall of Suharto1, Indonesia 
molded its political system from being one of the most centralized to one of the most 
decentralized in the world. The speed and scope at which it happened had astounded all 
observers of Indonesian politics, the process has been dubbed as the ‘big bang’ process.2 This 
devolution of power was significant as almost overnight, 473 district heads became 
responsible for the funding and implementation of socio-economic development including 
health, education and public works to an average of 500,000 people.3 Despite its unique 
features and its distinctive democratization process, Indonesia has remained invisible in the 
global arena and thus few have been written on the subject of Indonesia’s democratization 
and decentralization process.  
Despite a relatively successful decentralization process, the problem of rampant 
corruption in the country remains. While a World Bank study suggests that an ethnically 
diverse country does make it harder for states to establish strong, corrupt-free government 
institutions 4 , this paper seeks to delve deeper into the extent to which Indonesia’s 
decentralization process post-1998 and the change in corruption levels have affected the 
ability of public officials to deliver public services and bring about a higher socio-economic 
development. It will focus its analysis by looking at how changes in legal laws and political 
structures affected the incentives structure of various actors and sectors and whether it has 
made them less or more likely to partake in corrupt activities.  
                                            
1 Sohearto was Indonesia’s second president, who ruled under an authoritarian regime for 32 years  
2 Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank 
2 Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank 
(2002): 2-27.  
3 Stein Kristiansen et al, “Public Sector Reforms and Financial Transparency: Experiences from Indonesian 
Districts,” Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 31 No.1 (2008): 66. 
4 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Political Corruption and Democracy," Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 
Paper 592: 363-378. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592   
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This paper finds a strong relationship between decentralization and corruption in 
Indonesia because of the context under which it operates in. With the Dutch colonization and 
authoritarian rule of Suharto in the backdrop, Indonesia has long been burdened with the 
problems of corruption, which only exacerbated under the fragmentation of the bribe 
collection system during the decentralization process and affected the ability of public 
officials to contribute to higher socio-economic development in the country.    
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II. ANALYSIS 
General theories on democratization, decentralization and corruption:  
Quite surprisingly, the impact of democratization on corruption produces mixed 
econometrics evidence. Previous studies conducted by various scholars have shown that 
while Ades and Di Tella (1998), Goel and Nelson (2005), Chowdhury (2004) and Triesman 
argue that the more liberal democratic values a state has, corruption level will fall suit; other 
scholars, such as, Fan et al, De Mello and Barenstein (2001), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and 
Barenstein have suggested that a decentralized system has a negative effect on corruption.5  
At first glance, it is easy to come to the conclusion that democratization should lead to 
a reduction in corruption because the checks and balances mechanism in a democracy should 
constrain politicians’ greed6, protect civil liberties and free speech, increase proximity, 
transparency and accountability between elected leader and its constituents.7 Democratization 
should shift some of the power of the government to the people; and by being accountable to 
the people, the level of corruption would decrease. In addition, the ability of the people to 
select and remove the politicians of their choosing should encourage corrupt politicians to 
weigh in the socio-political cost more of engaging in such actions.8 With the election and re-
election mechanism, corrupt activities would bear a higher cost on society as it will alienate 
voters, reducing the chance of corrupt politicians to get reelected.9  
In practice, the relationship between democratization and corruption might not be as 
straightforward. Michael Rock pointed out that theory and case show that democratization 
                                            
5 Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze, “Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research,” ANU: 
Asian Pacific Economic Literature (2013): 81-83.  
6 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Political Corruption and Democracy," Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 
Paper 592: 363-378. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592    
7 Chanchal Sharma, “Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the degree and evaluating the outcomes,” The 
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 67 No.1 (2006): 56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856192 . 
8 Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus and Michael Lusztig, “Corruption, Democracy and Economic Growth,” 
International Political Science Review Vol.27 No.2 (2006): 124. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445044. 
9 Ibid.  
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does breed corruption, at least up to a point.10 This is due to the idea that young democracies 
suffer from insufficient checks and balances mechanism, and the lack of transparency and 
accountability in the early stages make it easier for rent seekers to exploit the system and 
have greater access to public officials without opening them up to public scrutiny. He also 
found that the turning point in the relationship between corruption and durability of 
democracy occurs between 4-15 years.11 Moreover, within an electoral democracy, the 
competitiveness created amongst political candidates is presumed to reduce corruption, 
however, the increased competitiveness could also bring along money politics involved in 
campaigning, which would further increase the likelihood of corruption. When a young 
democracy lacks the appropriate checks and balances mechanism, it opens itself up for 
greater state capture by local elites.12  
Decentralization is defined as, “The transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies 
to field units of central government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi autonomous public authorities or corporations, and area-wide, regional or 
functional authorities.13” The decentralization of power is often times one of the most 
important elements of democratization. As power is delegated from the central government to 
regional governments, it produces the opportunity for a state to create a more equal balance 
of power and ensures that no one branch is powerful enough to shape the politics of the 
country.14 Decentralization also aims to create more accountability and ensure higher public 
service delivery, as the elected representative would be closer to the people. Nonetheless, 
                                            
10 Michael Rock, “Corruption and Democracy,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
Working Papers No. 55 (2007): 3-4. http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp55_2007.pdf  
11 Ibid. 
12 Chanchal Sharma, “Decentralization Dilemma: Measuring the degree and evaluating the outcomes,” The 
Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 67 No.1 (2006): 56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856192 . 
13 Arellano Colongon, Jr. “What Is Happening on the Ground? The Progress of Decentralisation,” in Local 
Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 88. 
14 Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51 
No.2 (2003): 181.  
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decentralization does not always reap positive benefits, as the delegation to a very small 
region would make macroeconomic management a complicated task to do, lead to bigger 
interregional disparities and would not be successful in maintaining accountability if the 
mechanism is not there yet. Khan (2002) argues that in order for decentralization to improve 
governance and accountability at the local level, it has to have an effective general election, 
the ability of the local politicians to control bureaucrats, and the availability of public 
indicators to assess government performance.15 Sadly, these three features are often found 
missing in developing countries.  
Context: chronological account on the downfall of Suharto 
 While each country’s political development is unique to their own, and that a 
generalized theory often does not apply to all countries in the same way, such example is 
found in the case of Indonesia following the downfall of Suharto. The downfall of Suharto in 
May 1998 marked a watershed in Indonesia’s history; and a clear understanding of the event 
is necessary in order to fully appreciate Indonesia’s democratic transition.16 For 32 years, 
Suharto’s grip on power as the second president of Indonesia was unyielding and ruthless. 
Calling his regime the ‘New Order,’ Suharto ruled over a military dictatorship, where the 
army interceded in almost all aspects of life.17 Although he was often criticized for his many 
human rights abuses, he was also praised for his ability to remarkably improve Indonesia’s 
economy, education, health and overall living conditions. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and the consequences that followed greatly undermined Suharto’s power, and ultimately 
played a momentous role in Suharto’s downfall. However, there were also other pre-existing 
problems that weakened his power, namely, the weaknesses of the New Order government, 
                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 Douglas Ramage, “INDONESIA: Democracy First, Good Governance Later,” Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies (2007): 135. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27913330 . 
17 Pete Brown, Indonesia: downfall of a dictator, Communist Voice, 1 August 1998, available from 
http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/18cSuharto.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2011.  
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nepotism and corruption in the country, Suharto’s eroding legitimacy, gradual loss of support 
from the Army and his ministers and the general discontentment in the country. Simply put, 
the Asian Financial Crisis sped up the process of his downfall and when the subsidies on 
consumer goods were lifted, the pressure was too much for Suharto’s already frail 
government to handle. 
Unsurprisingly, in an atmosphere where the centralized political structure of the 
previous regime was challenged, decentralization seemed inevitable and stood like the only 
choice in a population whose fed up with the concentration of power among Suharto’s inner 
circles and in Jakarta. With the sudden removal of Suharto from power, the cycle of Suharto-
centric cronyism and nepotism dissolved as they had lost the figure that had glued them all 
together.  
Indonesia’s decentralization process   
The overarching feature of Indonesia’s democratization process was the unique speed 
and scope at which it happened. Dr. Christian von Lübke reflected this sentiment, saying that 
it was surprising that the central government relegated its duties in such a short time to such a 
low level.18 The political and administrative devolution of power that took place were at a 
level previously unheard of, immediately transferring political, fiscal and administrative 
power to 500 sub-national governments at the district level in only 1.5 years.19 In accordance 
to decentralization theories, it was introduced with the aim of fostering democracy and 
introducing legitimacy in a political system that had just overcome decades of authoritarian 
rule. The idea of a federalist system was discarded immediately due to fears of disintegration 
                                            
18 Christian von Lübke (researcher at the Arnold Bergstrasser Institut in Freiburg, Germany) in discussion with 
the author, November 4, 2014 
19 Ibid.  
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and the repulsion towards the Dutch colonization history.20Marcus Mietzner, a leading 
scholar on Indonesia’s democratization, dubbed decentralization as a “political response 
towards Balkanization in Indonesia.21” 
The main driving force behind Indonesia’s decentralization was political, namely, fear 
of disintegration in an atmosphere seasoned with secessionist movements in Aceh and 
Papua.22 Secondly, the other main reason for decentralization was the need to improve 
people’s welfare, as it was hoped that by giving more power to the districts, regional leaders 
would be able to deliver more appropriate public services to the people.23 The first reason 
accounts for why devolution of power was given to districts instead of provinces, as the 
central government was worried that giving more power to a bigger and more powerful 
province would further fuel separatist tensions in the country. The central government thus 
believed that transferring some powers would appease them and forestall future secessionist 
aspirations.24 However, by doing so, it makes it harder for districts – with more limited 
resources and capable personnel than provinces – to be able to deliver higher socio-economic 
development.  
Admittedly, the decision to decentralize was not an easy one to make. Having been 
colonized by the Dutch for 343 years has created a strong nationalism out of the anti-colonial 
struggle for independence.25 It is the same nationalism that sustained the centralization of the 
nation-state during Sukarno and Suharto’s era, which made the introduction of 
                                            
20 Gabriele Ferazzi, “Using the ‘F’ Word: Federalism in Indonesia’s Decentralization Discourse,” Publius 
Vol.30 No.2 (2000): 66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331088 
21 Felix Heiduk (researcher at the SWP in Berlin, Germany) in discussion with the author, October 23, 2014 
22 Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public 
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall. 
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 268-269 
23 Linggawaty Hakim (Indonesian ambassador to Switzerland in Bern, Switzerland) in discussion with the 
author, November 5, 2014 
24 Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public 
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall. 
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 268-269 
25 Paul Carnegie, “Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Transition 
Dynamics,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 81 No. 4 (2008-2009): 518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377625 
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decentralization measures even more of a significant feat in Indonesian politics.26 Looking of 
it from a geopolitical lens, it also made perfect sense for Indonesia to decentralize as the 
archipelago is amazingly diverse in terms of geography and ethno-demography.27 Giving the 
regions autonomy would allow each region to fully express themselves culturally, socially 
and politically, all the while maintaining national unity.28  
The two most crucial decentralization laws that were introduced were Law 
No.25/1999 on revenue sharing and Law No.22/1999 on regional government, both of which 
were introduced in 2001. These two laws transferred a great degree of political authority to 
the district and municipality level of government, leaving the central government with the 
responsibilities of deciding on matters such as security and defense, foreign policy, justice 
and religious affairs.29At the time when these two laws were introduced, there were 
surprisingly few debates and amendments, which signaled a positive willingness to create 
genuine reform towards democracy and better governance.30 Ryaas Rasyid, the head of the 
committee involved with formulating decentralization policies and legislations, recalled that, 
"Members of parliament generally considered the bills to be too good to be true; for the first 
time, the government itself had initiated a policy to reduce its own powers and surrender 
authority to the regions in a significant way.31" 
Law No.25/1999 on revenue sharing outlines a new system of fiscal arrangements 
between Indonesia’s national and subnational political entities. The new law guarantees at 
                                            
26 Paul Carnegie, “Democratization and Decentralization in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Understanding Transition 
Dynamics,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 81 No. 4 (2008-2009): 518. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377625 . 
27 Kai Kaiser, “The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective,” World Bank 
(2002): 2-27. 
28 Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in 
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 71. 
29 Michael Buehler, “Decentralisation and Local Democracy in Indonesia: the Marginalisation of the Public 
Sphere,” in Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall. 
(Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 267. 
30 Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in 
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 63. 
31 Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Local Power and Politics in 
Indonesia, ed. By Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 63. 
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least 26% of net domestic revenue to local governments, of which 90% had to be allocated to 
districts and municipalities.32 Since local transfers had never reached 25% in the years prior 
to 1999, the fiscal decentralization policy significantly increases the revenues of local 
governments.33 In addition to earning revenues from local taxes and user charges,34 local 
governments also earn intergovernmental fund transfer from the central government in the 
form of DAU (General Allocation Fund), DAK (Specific Allocation Fund), and revenue 
sharing for taxes and natural resources. 35  One unique aspect of Indonesia’s fiscal 
decentralization process is that it only affects the expenditure side of the district budgets, as 
revenues remain largely centralized.36 An implication of the law is the high share of 
intergovernmental transfers make for a high budget dependence of the local government to 
the central government, and makes local government vulnerable to political intervention.37  
Law No.22/1999 on regional government spelled out the conditions for the devolution 
of political authority, initially stipulating that district heads, mayors and governors were to be 
elected by local parliaments.38 However, when it was found out that local parliaments were 
using their power for rent-seeking purposes, the central government issued Law No.32/2004 
on regional government, which introduced direct, popular elections for district heads, mayors 
and governors. The introduction of direct election for regional heads in 2004 truly marked 
Indonesia’s leap towards consolidating their democracy, by giving the people, as well as the 
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37 Syarif Syahrial, “Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: The Case of Indonesia,” Economics and 
Finance in Indonesia Vol.53 No.2 (2005): 181.  
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subnational governments, as district heads who are now allowed to introduce their own 
regulations and appoint their own civil servants in local parliament secretariat, more power. 39 
The new law was introduced with the hopes of reducing the influence of political parties, 
increasing accountability and strengthening checks and balances mechanism as it put into 
effect term limits for regents, mayors, governors, presidents and vice presidents to two 5-year 
terms.40  
The progress that direct elections have shown in helping the consolidation of 
Indonesia’s democracy is remarkable. Between 2004 and 2009, on average, over 100 
subnational elections were run annually, with the average Indonesian voting in seven or eight 
separate ballots in those five years.41 Moreover, the replacement of Law No.3/1999 on 
general elections, which called for a closed list party system, by the new Law No.12/2003 on 
general elections, which introduces an open list party system helped to boost transparency 
and accountability at the local level.42 To further increase competitiveness among candidates, 
in December 2008, the Constitutional Court abolished party list rankings and in the 2009 
elections, allowed for individual candidates to be put on the ballot regardless of their party 
ranks.43  
However, these new laws come with several dire consequences. Not only is the bar 
set very high for candidates to appear on the ballots without party support, those who thought 
they stood a chance of winning a seat in a local parliament often find themselves in massive 
debt, so much so that some of them had committed suicide or suffered a mental breakdown.44 
Additionally, the execution of some of the past direct elections was also tainted with 
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incidences of vote rigging and other irregularities.45 Unfortunately, the introduction of direct 
elections is not enough to change the corruption patterns. One reason for the increase in 
corruption scandals in subnational politics is the weak legal and social sanctions against their 
behaviors, legal loopholes and the weak upholding of the rule of law by the judiciary. In 2006, 
more than 1,000 local parliamentarians were implicated in corruption-related charges, and in 
2008, more than 20 governors, former governors, district heads and mayors were detained or 
suspected to be involved in corruption cases.46 The reason behind these rampant corruption 
charges could perhaps be explained by the link between introduction of direct local elections 
and the funding of campaigns by local businesses,47 which is also a problem found in mature 
democracies such as the US because the high cost of congressional races must be raised from 
private sources.48   
The challenge then for democratic systems is to find the delicate balance between 
financing political campaigns without encouraging candidates to depend heavily on private 
sources to support them.49 Another reason is that the rapid fiscal decentralization to 473 
regional leaders has made them vulnerable to acts of corruption, collusion and nepotism.50 
The incidences of corruption have become so common that the term ‘money politics’ has 
been attached to almost all elections for governors and mayors.51 This goes to show that some 
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electoral systems are more vulnerable to special interest influences and other means of public 
oversight are needed for direct elections to be a successful aspect of democracy.52  
To respond to this problem, the central government established the Legislative 
Election Law in 2007, which called for the creation of an election oversight agency, Bawaslu 
(Election Monitoring Agency), tasked to monitor campaigns and election rules violations.53 
Additionally, changes in the judiciary – the shifting of authority to arbitrate disputes in 
subnational executive elections from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court – has 
also helped to build the legitimacy of the elections.54 The responsiveness of the central 
government to these issues and the high level of public involvement in exposing bribery and 
other corruption acts have helped to increase the credibility of subnational elections.55 
Furthermore, the public support for direct elections is overwhelming, which was aptly 
reflected through the direct demands against the recent UUD Pilkada56 referendum in 
September 2014.57 The general population argued that their participation in the direct 
elections is a strong political empowerment tool; and taking them away would greatly impair 
transparency and accountability between them and their regional leaders.58 It has been an 
interesting turnaround of events as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed a presidential decree 
at the last minute to return the status quo of direct elections. However, it still has to go 
through the DPR, the only chamber with the power to pass laws that defines a legislature.59  
Currently, the committee session in the DPR in charge of processing this issue has not 
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resumed yet. Therefore, at the point that this paper is written, this issue has not yet been 
resolved.60  
When looking at the initial stages of decentralization in Indonesia, one cannot 
overlook the contribution of Habibie, Indonesia’s 3rd president. As a man from Sulawesi, he 
disliked the Java-centric development and state apparatus, and expedited the decentralization 
process. In addition, the need to set himself apart from his predecessor and as a reformer also 
hastened the speed of the special session of the MPR on decentralization.61 Paul Carnegie 
dubbed Habibie’s period as a ‘Gorbachevesque period of political reform,62’ and indeed it 
was. Habibie’s pragmatism and fear of grassroots insurgencies made for a smoother 
democratic transition.63 Habibie, who was a technocrat himself, asked Ryaas Rasyid, another 
technocrat, to create a group called “Tim Tujuh” (Team Seven) to formulate policy and 
legislation64 and ensure the establishment of a clear line separating decentralization and 
federalism.  
Nonetheless, the hasty speed at which decentralization took place was done at the 
expense of effectiveness and efficiency.65 In May 1999, the parliament rushed through the 
regional government and center-region financial relations bills to promise broad autonomy to 
the regions, noting that this would only apply to districts while provinces should remain 
limited in their power.66 From the initial implementation stage, the bill already proved to 
contain many inconsistencies, which led to poor implementation and confusion among those 
trying to implement it. Remnants of the centralistic system of the Suharto regime also had not 
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shed off completely, making it even harder to form new institutional formation and 
bureaucratic behavior across the archipelago.67 
To make matters worse, Indonesia had undergone a Pemekaran Process, a bottom up 
process of decentralization, in which the number of districts swiftly blossomed to close to 
500 districts; which accounted for a 60% increase in regional autonomy.68 The competitions 
amongst regions made the task of the central government harder, especially in light of the 
fact that some of these districts do not necessarily have the capacity to be independent and 
self-sufficient. Instead of creating more accountability to the people, many of the new 
districts ended up being overpowered by special interests that were only interested in power 
and the new autonomy their district would receive.69 
Status of Indonesia’s Democracy  
The process of consolidating a political system does not happen overnight, and while 
Indonesia has had successes in its 16 years of democratization, it also still has a long way to 
go to fully consolidate its democracy. By almost all measures, Indonesia would now be 
considered as an open democratic system with free and fair elections, decentralization of 
power away from Jakarta, high voter turnout rates, free press, and the formation of advocacy 
groups and civil society organizations.70 Indonesia has mostly checked off the factors that 
make up an electoral democracy, however, issues of corruption and weak law enforcement 
have made it harder for Indonesia to be considered a liberal democracy.71 Admittedly, 
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compared to its East Asian counterparts, Indonesia’s rule of law and quality of governance 
remain lower, though support for democracy and liberal democratic values compare 
favorably.72 The challenge and threshold for Indonesia now in being classified as a liberal 
democracy is when it can prove to be formidable against threats of reversal and ensure that 
democracy becomes ‘the only game in town.73’  
 Even with the strong support for democracy in Indonesia, scholars have started to 
question the authenticity of Indonesia’s democratization due to the strong influence of the old 
political elites.74 Education barriers, financial charges and logistical thresholds have been set 
in place to bar new candidates to enter the realm of politics. Liberals with the likes of Jeffrey 
Winters, Vedi Hadiz and Robinson have maintained the view that strong oligarchs remain a 
powerful force in Indonesia’s democracy largely support this view, and local politics have 
become dominated by predatory elites.75 Vedi Hadiz argued that democracy in Indonesia has 
been “all about elites and wealth and the preservation of power of the powerful 
conglomerates…[and that] democracy hasn’t really changed anything.76”  
Notwithstanding the role that money plays and the political power that these oligarchs 
hold, scholars like Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner contend that the power of these old 
political elites have decreased because they have had to subordinate themselves to new 
elements and principles in Indonesian politics.77 They have then adapted themselves to fit the 
new rules of the game, thereby reducing a significant amount of their previously unrestrained 
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influence.78 It is hoped that overtime as democratic institutions start to set its roots in 
Indonesian politics, it would also modify and mold the behaviors of these old political elites 
to more representative and competitive politics.79 Milestones such as the passing of major 
constitutional amendments in 2002 without the intervention of major intra-elite conflict have 
also helped to build the legitimacy and authenticity of Indonesia’s democratization.80 
Therefore, given that decentralization goes well, it would stand as an important cornerstone 
of Indonesia’s democratization process.81 
Status of Corruption in Indonesia 
Despite several positive progresses, Indonesia’s decentralization process has also 
suffered from challenges of rampant corruption spreading at the local and regional level. 
Corruption is traditionally defined as breaking of the rules by public officials for private gain 
that distorts resource allocation and the effectiveness of the economy.82 Corruption activities 
include bribing in exchange for favorable treatment, favoring family members and relatives 
and giving them preferential treatment (nepotism), and illegal coordination in order to gain an 
unfair advantage (collusion).83 Some of the negative effects of corruption include: less 
resource allocation for productive activities, economic and political uncertainties, and 
increased cost of business.84 While corruption could theoretically exist alongside electoral 
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politics, corrupt democratic governments hold the power to reform themselves85 and are 
associated with lower confidence in public institutions.86 
During the New Order regime, the main actors of rent seeking mostly consisted of 
Suharto’s families, cronies, bureaucrats and the military. The degree of nepotism that 
entrenched Indonesia’s social, economy and political sphere has become a public secret, and 
became one of the fuel for the student demonstrations in May 1998 that brought Suharto’s 
32-year iron fist rule to an end. These corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) acts could 
be found in the way Suharto used Golkar as party vehicle to exploit powerful local 
aristocrats, and government projects as the main object of kickbacks, payments, and 
favoritism in the business and investment sector.87 Nonetheless, despite the centralized and 
conspicuous traces of corruption in the country, the New Order era was successful in 
minimizing rents based on transfer because of central planning and coordination, as well as 
its ability to minimize political conflicts. 88  Even with the high costs associated with 
corruption and bureaucratic red tape, these costs were predictable and calculated as part of 
transaction costs.89 The monopoly of big businesses by Suharto’s family members and 
cronies were also easier to manage than the harassment that may come from many local level 
bureaucrats.90  This political stability then translated to the high economic growth rates and 
capitalist developments both at the central and local levels.91 With its strong system of 
                                            
85 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Political Corruption and Democracy," Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 
Paper 592: 363-378. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/592   
86 Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze, “Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research,” ANU: 
Asian Pacific Economic Literature (2013): 85. 
87 Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51 
No.2 (2003): 187. 
88 Ibid, 179. 
89 Ari Kuncoro, “Bribery and Time Wasted in Indonesia: A test of the Efficient Grease Hypothesis,” Economics 
and Finance in Indonesia Vol.52 No.1 (2006): 34. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Akhmad Rizal Shidiq, “Decentralization and Rent-Seeking in Indonesia,” Ekonomi dan Keuangan Vol.51 
No.2 (2003): 179. 
 
 
 
  Kirana 
 
 
22 
patronage, the issue of corruption became less detrimental economically in Suharto-era 
Indonesia than in a politically decentralized system.92  
In contrast, decentralization has not brought upon favorable results in terms of 
nominal economic growth or socio-economic development. 93  Despite advocates and 
opponents of decentralizing agreeing that it would lead to better governance and local 
accountability, they have failed to take into account that decentralization would bring forth 
more rent seeking opportunities and higher corruption incidences.94 Granted, right after 
Suharto’s regime was toppled, there were various calls and committees created to conduct 
investigations on the wealth that Suharto’s families and cronies had amassed while they were 
in power,95 signaling a positive trend towards the reduction of corruption and nepotism. 
However, given the weak law enforcement, most of the wealth were never investigated and 
most of the anger were only directed towards a few people, the most popular being Suharto’s 
son, Tommy Suharto.96  
In terms of other corrupt activities, they may have even exacerbated in the Reformasi 
period. With more empowered local leaders and more bureaucratic institutions, there are 
more loopholes in which special interests could fit themselves in and capture pieces of wealth 
here and there.97 Local elite capture could take place because horizontal accountability still 
tends to be very weak, despite theories showing that new budgeting system in the Reformasi 
era should have introduced a more accountable and transparent budget policy in local 
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government.98 The disarray has also been caused by the blurring of accountability, which can 
be seen in the way local parliament members are unable to access district budget details and 
central government’s losing control over local governments’ financial arrangements.99 These 
alarming corruption patterns lead to an even more alarming conclusion: decentralization of 
political power also led to new structure of predatory networks of patronage and the 
decentralization of corruption. McLeod (2005) argued that democratization saw the fall of the 
franchise system, the rise of money politics and the re-emergence of franchise actors as 
participants in Indonesia’s newly democratic polity, compromising its democratic 
consolidation.100  
Within a comparative and theoretical framework, there are mixed empirical evidences 
that show that fiscal, political and administrative decentralization could reduce corruption 
and improve public service delivery (in countries such as Bolivia, Switzerland, Bangladesh 
and Albania), and there are those that conclude otherwise (in countries such as China and 
India).101 One thing that most scholars agree on is that decentralization was a positive force 
and development towards more stability and fewer separatism movements and regional 
violence in Indonesia. 102  However, critics have also noted two main criticisms of 
decentralization, namely, the decline in the quality of governance due to incapacity of local 
administrators and increasing regional inequality, and the undermining of national cohesion 
due to constant miscommunication and lack of coordination between the central and regional 
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government.103 Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall succinctly summarized the outcome of 
the decentralization process, noting that, “Overall, decentralization has massively 
transformed the face of Indonesia and its politics, but it has proven to be neither the nemesis 
feared by its critics nor the savior anticipated by its advocates.104”  
How democratization, decentralization and corruption have affected the ability of 
different sectors and actors to deliver public goods to the people  
 The crux of the analysis lies in how decentralization policies have changed the 
incentives for actors in various sectors to partake in corrupt activities, which would in turn 
determine their ability to contribute to and improve the country’s socio-economic 
development. It is important to investigate the incentives faced by various actors as human 
actors are affected by and affect political culture and institutions.105 Additionally, since 
decentralization policies have affected almost all facets of society, it is crucial to carefully 
analyze the labyrinth of decision-making processes that these different actors undergo.106 The 
analysis that follows will focus on how the changes in legal framework and political 
structures lead to the ability or the disability of different actors to deliver public goods and 
achieve higher socio-economic development.  
Local leaders  
 Since the main premise of decentralization was to give more power and autonomy to 
the districts, the main analysis would focus on how it has impacted various district heads. It is 
the sector where everyone had hoped decentralization policies would help most: by having 
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leaders who are closer to the people, transparency and accountability would increase and they 
would be able to improve socio-economic development of their own respective districts.  
 Since political and administrative authorities were dissolved to 473 districts with 
different levels of political culture and institutions, consequently, decentralization policies 
affected them in various ways, and coming up with a universal conclusion then becomes a 
complicated task. Additionally, at the time the policies were implemented, the different 
regions were also at varying states of preparedness, and the vagueness of the law has made 
them up for interpretation by each respective district.107 As a result, coming up with 
generalizations is almost impossible, as some districts have remained in tight oligarchic 
control while others have completely embraced reformist leaders and ideas.108 In this regard, 
scholars are only able to offer anecdotal evidences based on individual cases.109  
 Some noticeable strengths of decentralization are evidence suggesting that the 
increasing probability of external audits by the central government significantly reduced 
missing funds in the project,110 local governments becoming more responsive to lower levels 
of local public infrastructure,111 and the ability of the people to watch more closely and throw 
out corrupt or underperforming local officials.112 There are also now more channels for social 
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control and more democratic decision-making processes, which would hopefully help to 
reduce corruption at the local level.113  
 However, people have grown more frustrated over the years as they still find it hard to 
influence and shape local politics as expected.114 The lack of guidelines from the central 
government has exacerbated uncertainty and tensions in the regions as each district started to 
interpret the law whimsically.115 Contrary to the general expectations, there is also a lack of 
transparency and checks and balances mechanism in all districts.116 Consequently, the 
conditions make it very vulnerable for political capture, which then furthers the interests of 
specialized elite groups, threatening the speed and promise of economic and political 
development.117 A general consensus that seems to be agreed upon by various scholars who 
have done field research in Indonesia is the lack of relevant experience of the officials in 
charge. As regional autonomy grows, so do the incentives for local politicians to collude, as 
they now possess a type of autonomy and power previously unbeknownst to them.118 
Incidentally, as the district heads become more powerful, they are also more prone to local 
elite capture; as they are now able to provide these elites with the privileges that they need to 
continue their monopolistic and nepotistic ways.119 Furthermore, some clans have also seized 
the opportunity to turn their district into personal fiefdoms and have secured strategic 
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government positions for family members and their inner circle, reversing the stronghold of 
the grassroots democratic movement that helped bring Suharto down from power.120   
 To be fair, the blame for the lack of accountability at the local level cannot be fully 
put on the central government, as the newly minted regional heads are also trying hard to 
maintain their regional autonomy in the face of higher levels of the hierarchical executive 
system.121 Given this mindset, any attempts by the central government to strengthen vertical 
accountability and coordinate policies were immediately rejected among leading district 
bureaucrats.122 On the other hand, some districts also recalled the reluctance of the central 
government to fully pass on their authorities as required by the law, seen through the 
slowness of the supporting regulations for Law 22 and 25/1999, inconsistencies in law 
implementation and reactive manner in ratifying regulations.123 The tension between the 
central and local governments has made it harder for them to work together to reach higher 
levels of socio-economic development.  
 Specifically, a main problem of miscommunication and lack of coordination started to 
become most visible in the environmental protection realm. Firstly, districts were now 
responsible for issuing its own small and medium scale logging concessions, which has led to 
collusion amongst local politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen over control of forest 
areas.124 The collusion at the local level has complicated the work of the central government 
to keep a strong national mandate for reducing deforestation and solving the haze problem.125 
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In addition, this implies that decentralization has also led to more deforestation on a large 
scale as districts are getting 80% of the revenues. The huge financial incentives have often 
times outweigh the need to stay in line with the central government’s commitment to reduce 
deforestation.126  
 With regards to the fiscal decentralization, all of a sudden district heads are 
responsible for 40% of the primary and secondary education, health services, environmental 
protection and infrastructure aspect of their budget.127 A study conducted by Krisztina Kis-
Katos and Günther Schulze at the University of Freiburg finds that districts spend an 
overwhelming 33.3% of their entire budget on general administrative spending and not on 
public services.128 To paint a comparison, developed countries such as the US and Norway 
only spend 3% and 8%, respectively, on administrative expenses. The high administrative 
spending sheds a light on the lack of incentives on behalf of the district heads to improve 
public service delivery.129 The results also indicate that accountability mechanisms are still 
weak at the local level and democratization policies have not yet contributed to reduction in 
wasteful government spending. 130  Their finding is in line with the idea that corrupt 
democratic government will not contribute to higher socio-economic development, as they 
will continuously spend the money on themselves and not on the people.131 The high 
incidences of money politics at the local level have also led them to come to the conclusion 
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that corruption has not declined significantly under democratization, but rather has become 
more decentralized and harder to detect.132  
 The result of the study is echoed by Michael Buehler, a leading expert on Indonesia’s 
democratization, who noted that, “despite decentralization initiatives, public service delivery 
has not improved at the local level since 1999.133” Other reasons that account for the lack of 
socio-economic development (that may not necessarily be caused by corruption) are the lack 
of leadership, technical know-how and information on how to improve public service 
delivery at the local level, both in terms of fiscal and political decentralization.134 Another 
reason is the difficulty that local leaders face in forming coherent and effective projects, 
thereby failing to use the annual budget effectively for development areas.135 For example, by 
July 2008, the province of Jakarta had spent only 17% of its annual budget.136 When new 
regulations were introduced, they were often of low quality and have obstructed economic 
activity, such as the introduction of predatory taxes that hamper investment.137  
 On the bright side of things, the empowerment of local leaders has given birth to the 
rise of centennials with the likes of Joko Widodo, who started out as a mayor in Solo, then 
governor of Jakarta and now the 7th president of Indonesia. Commonly referred to as Jokowi, 
he was a man born out of the process of decentralization; and his rise signaled the demand 
and need for more reformists in the government and set the tone for change in Indonesia’s 
political culture. Other reformist leaders such as Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (vice governor of 
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Jakarta) and Tri Rismaharini (mayor of Surabaya) were also helped by these decentralization 
policies as it allowed them to reach high levels of popularity based on perceptions of 
improved service, even in areas where it appeared to have been very modest.138  
Parliament 
 The parliament is also another key sector in Indonesia’s democratization process as it 
has historically been the site of competition between the residual forces of the New Order 
elites and new contenders.139 After the downfall of Suharto, the amended constitution now 
gives three chambers a role in the legislative process. While largely a rubber stamp institution 
under the executive-heavy leadership style of Suharto, the parliament started to play an 
important role with the introduction of free and fair elections, end of restrictions on civic 
freedoms and reforms carried out in 1999-2002 that shifted power away from the executive to 
the legislative.140 Specifically, the legislative now has the power to receive all reports of the 
State Audit Agency and appoint their members, select members of the Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission, select Indonesian ambassadors and veto 
those proposed by foreign countries and approve the appointment of the armed forces, chief 
of police and members of the KPK and other officials.141 The shifting of power to the 
legislative in the early stages of the Reformasi era was a necessary response towards the 
centralization of power in the executive during both Sukarno142 and Suharto’s rule, and it was 
hoped that the legislative would act as a strong checks and balances mechanism for the 
executive during the Reformasi period.  
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 However, today, it is contended that the balance of power has swung too heavily on 
the legislative side, which is offsetting the initial need for the checks and balances 
mechanisms.143 Tilting the scale in favor of one branch of the government would further 
encourage corruption. Yuki Fukuoka writes, “Democratization, or the growing importance of 
the parliament, as well as political elites in accessing and controlling state resources, enabled 
them to regain access to patronage.144” Furthermore, the closed-door meetings have made it 
harder for the public to monitor individual performance of DPR legislators and their parties. 
In addition, the compartmentalization of the structure of the DPR in committees has also 
contributed to the collusive nature of the institution.145 Finally, in an article, “Public Sector 
Reforms and Financial Transparency: Experiences from Indonesian Districts,” published by 
the Contemporary Southeast Asia Journal, it notes that, “local members of parliament are 
normally elected based on their willingness to pay their electorates and are therefore easily 
silenced by financial sharing arrangements with the district head and his team of leading 
bureaucrats.146” All of these factors make it hard for the DPR to build their legitimacy of the 
legislative as a KKN-free institution.  
 Nevertheless, there has been several positive developments in the parliament, such as 
the growing role of the opposition parties that act as checks and balances system in the 
legislative,147 decline of favor extortion from ministries, state-owned enterprises and private 
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companies148 and the increased public hearings and people’s forum. All of these activities 
combined have contributed greatly to the routinization of democracy in Indonesia.149 In an 
interview with Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, who has written extensively on the role of the 
parliament in Indonesia’s democratization, he commented that even with the DPR’s flaws 
and incompetency, it is important for Indonesia to have a strong counterpart to the 
executive’s power. He also noted that the checks and balances system in the government is 
currently working, as shown through the dominance of Koalisi Merah Putih (KMP), led by 
Prabowo, who has the majority in both the MPR and DPR, which is giving the executive, led 
by Jokowi, a hard time.150 
Judiciary 
 Perhaps the judiciary has one of the worst reputations in the Indonesian government 
as its reputation has been smeared with low judicial standards, lax enforcement151 and a 
dysfunctional criminal justice system.152 In a democratic state, the judiciary plays a critical 
role in upholding a strong rule of law and a strict law enforcement mechanism to reduce the 
incentives for politicians and other public officials to get involved in corrupt acts. When 
political elites do not face the rightful consequences and could simply wield off any charges 
with money, it sends a negative message that the rule of law could simply be undermined 
when one has a big enough political influence and financial resources. These kinds of 
behavior add to the atmosphere of corruption, and encourage big scale corruption as well as 
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petty corruption from the lowest level of the government and civil service.153 The root cause 
of the legal disarray perhaps lies in the constant game of extortion and forced-sharing that 
redistributes wealth among Indonesia’s oligarchs and elites,154 low quality of legal training,155 
and the unpreparedness of the country’s legal structure which has been debilitated and 
defunct in the era of Suharto. Given the influence of the oligarchs in the judiciary, Jeffrey 
Winters noted that “democracy without law” is the scenario that Indonesia has been playing 
in since 1998.156 The need to reform the judiciary system holds great implication as it not 
only is a virtue by itself, but by strengthening the rule of law in the country, it would reduce 
the stronghold of the oligarchs and empower lower class groups157, and reduce the incentives 
for politicians to maneuver their influence for their own use and channel their influence to 
work towards improving the standard of living of the people.  
Businesses 
 Apart from the government, big businesses also play a strong role in giving the 
incentives for public servants to partake in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic activities. One 
way in which the intersection of business and politics contributed to the increase in 
corruption is the way that new local regulations on taxes, levies and other permits are 
designed to create artificial regulations. 158  Local bureaucrats have also taken it upon 
themselves to use their newly founded power to extract rents from corporations, further 
promoting rent-seeking behavior in the district-level. 159  Unsurprisingly, rent-seeking 
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activities in the business sector are mostly focused on bribery and other local government 
regulations, such as, business license, fire safety inspection, environmental compliance, 
taxes, and other permits.160 While doing business was not free of corruption either during the 
Sohearto era, at the very least it was centralized and controllable in a sense. With 
decentralization, it has also dispersed the local actors involved in bribery and rent taking. 
Perhaps, this sheds some light as to why even with pervasive corruption during the New 
Order, it did not exert too negative of an influence on economic growth in that area.161  
 More alarmingly today, however, is the growing involvement of big businesses and 
oligarchs in the realm of politics. Jeffrey Winters goes even further to say that, “For the first 
time in Indonesia’s modern history, its politics are more dominated by oligarchs than by 
fractious elites.162” The opportunities for corruption also became ripe after the fall of Suharto 
as the oligarchs responds to the idea that popular participation is welcomed in a democracy, 
and began to participate in public office, transforming Indonesia’s political system into an 
electoral ruling oligarchy.163 The irony became apparent in the availability of ways that 
oligarchs can now exercise their power in a democracy, further entrenching themselves in the 
politics, perhaps to an extent even further than they were in during the Suharto regime.164   
 Granted, the power of oligarchs is still constrained in a democracy, and though they 
are not the most powerful, they are formidable, and their influence over the country’s politics 
is deep and distorting.165 For example, oligarchs have the ability to dictate the course of 
politics by shaping who can run and get appointed to top party and government posts; and 
while the people are the ones who eventually decide the candidates, the selection of choices 
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are only amongst politicians who are backed by these oligarchs. 166 The ramification of this is 
quite troubling for Indonesia’s democracy, as an oligarch-controlled democracy has no strong 
incentives to improve its judicial independence and impose legal constraints on itself.167 
Unsurprisingly, the progressive liberals find themselves in disappointment as they are unable 
to exert as much power in post-Suharto Indonesia due to the lack of coordination and 
financial resources, especially with the rise of extra-legal forms of social and political 
corruption, violence and coercion.168 With the stronghold that these oligarchs have on 
Indonesia’s politics, it seems, then, that “the wealth power of oligarchs shapes and constrains 
Indonesia’s democracy far more than democracy constraints the power of wealth.169”  
NGOs and other civil society groups 
 Though Winters, Hediz and Robinson believe that the oligarchs have been the most 
powerful and dominating force in Indonesia’s democratization, it has faced oppositions from 
other scholars with the likes of Marcus Mietzner and Edward Aspinall, who contend that civil 
society groups and non-governmental organizations have been a great catalyst for 
democratization.170 Since the very early stages of democratization – during the May Riots 
that pressured Suharto to resign from power – they have been a productive force for 
democracy. Their presence in the political arena confronted the government with another 
force with the power to reshape the political landscape. Mietzner and Aspinall said that, 
“Without this energetic civil society activism, many of the key political reforms of the post-
                                            
166 S Jeffrey Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” in INDONESIA No.96 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2013), 22. 
167 Ibid, 33.  
168 Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robinson, “The Political Economy of Oligarchy and the Reorganization of Power in 
Indonesia,” in INDONESIA No.96 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2013), 52. 
169 Jeffrey Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” in INDONESIA No.96 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
2013), 11. 
170 Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, “Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: An Overview,” in 
Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia, ed. by Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. (Singapore: ISEAS, 
2010), 12. 
 
 
 
  Kirana 
 
 
36 
1998 period probably would not have materialized or would have been much weaker.171” 
Their presence can be felt in the rising number of organizations, forms of protests and 
communication networks dealing with issues of human rights, environmental activism, labor, 
and peasantry.172  
 The dynamics between civil society and oligarchs are interesting because as civil 
society groups become more active, the influence of the oligarchs would weaken.173 They, 
too, act as watchdogs to ensure that good governance and strong rule of law is upheld in the 
government; consequently ensuring that corruption in the government is reduced. 
Unfortunately, as of now, civil society groups still lack the necessary influence to make their 
voices heard in the parliament and affect the legislative processes.174 Other organizations 
such as the United Nations and state-affiliated organizations have helped with capacity 
building and combined efforts to reduce corruption in Indonesia and increase the likelihood 
of public service delivery.175 Aspinall noted that, “that these struggles [between the oligarchs 
and civil society] are complex, and take place in contradictory and fragmented ways, 
involving ever-shifting political coalitions and conflicts, reflects the complexity of 
Indonesian democracy and the kaleidoscopic patterns of social interest that underpin it.176”  
Media  
 The rise of civil society groups has also been aided by the growing role of the media 
in Indonesia’s democratization process. By and large the media has been free and fair, and a 
series of landmark Constitutional Court decisions since 2006 and the striking down of 
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passages in the Criminal Code that had allowed for punishment for slander against the 
government have helped to enhance the protection of media freedom.177 With the growing 
role of media that is free to criticize the government, it acts as a strong counterpoint against 
corrupt government officials. They stand as guards and reduce the socio-political incentives 
for corruption. The role of the media is also crucially important in understanding the level of 
corruption incidences in the country. Prior to May 1998, the media has been largely 
controlled by the government and was not allowed to criticize it in any way. Thus, it was not 
able to expose any KKN-related cases openly in the media. When comparing the changes in 
the level of corruption that with more transparency, it is easier to expose more corruption 
cases now, and therefore it could seem as if corruption incidences have gone up even when it 
has not.178   
Komisi Pemberantas Korupsi (KPK) 
 The creation of the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) under Megawati’s 
presidency in 2001 was undoubtedly a milestone in an effort to eradicate corruption in 
Indonesia.179 Its aggressiveness and efficiency have been known to deliver a number of high 
profile cases, including governors, general election commissioners, ministers and even its 
own members.180 However, given its small budget and number of employees, it has only been 
able to tackle between 12-30% of all corruption cases.181 Out of these numbers, most of the 
cases were related to the issue of corruption at the national level and less so at the district 
level, which are delegated to prosecutorial offices across the country. Their power will also 
continue to be limited so long as the judiciary remains weak as many cases of power abuses 
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continue to go unpunished.182 Additionally, the role of strong oligarchs also undermines the 
power of the judiciary to fully act independently and in some cases, influential figures have 
found ways to gain immunity from legal punishments.183 Nonetheless, the KPK has been 
successful in bringing to light and charging many corrupt politicians and business figures, 
which would have been impossible under the Suharto regime. Its work has sent a loud and 
clear message of anti-corruption and its presence and its growing importance would further 
deter politicians or other government officials from engaging in corrupt activities.  
Culture and society 
 Analyzing different actors’ socio-political incentives, it is hard to omit the role of 
culture in the equation. Indeed, social norms are an important determinant of corruption, but 
it is a hard element to capture.184 This issue was investigated by Eric Chang and Yun-Han 
Chu in their paper, “Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?” They 
defined Asian corruption exceptionalism as, “cultural subjectivity in terms of how people 
perceive corruption,” and interestingly, found that there is no such exceptionalism.185 Both 
Dr. Christian von Lübke and Dr Krisztina Kis-Katos concurred with the statement and noted 
that it is misleading to think that culture and corruption are linked because corruption could 
happen anywhere. To classify a country as having a corrupt culture in its nature, it presumes 
that it is an inherent problem that cannot be changed. Perhaps in some areas, corruption is 
much more expected, or there is a higher reliance on family, but as soon as the state is stable 
enough to take over some of those benefits that come from their extended family, these 
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corruption tendencies would disappear.186 Dr. von Lübke added that what matters far more 
than the culture argument is the difference in system of governance and quality of institutions 
across countries.187  
 Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain further noted that changing socio-political culture takes time 
and we need to be more realistic when we assess the changes in the level and spread of 
corruption.188 Jokowi’s victory in the recent presidential election is a positive step towards a 
more corrupt-free political system, though it is not going to change everything all at once. 
Since culture is a factor of political systems and institutions, overtime, as political systems 
and institutions reform themselves to be more democratic and circumstances change, so too 
would the culture be less accepting of corrupt behaviors.189  
Relationship between decentralization and corruption 
 Analyzing all of these different factors, we come to the conclusion that while 
decentralization was an important factor in Indonesia’s democratization process; it has also 
opened up new incentives for different actors to engage in corrupt activities. Given the 
difficulty in reaching a solid, objective and quantifiable number in measuring corruption, one 
could only rely on qualitative assessment and anecdotes that may not fully reflect the changes 
in corruption incidences in Indonesia. While the nominal level of corruption remains 
debatable, one echoing statement regarding decentralization and corruption does agree that 
political decentralization has led to the decentralization of corruption and the rise in petty 
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corruption.190 This is made possible through the disappearance of the ‘one-stop’ bribe system 
during the New Order and the rise of more fragmented bribe collection system.191 Due to the 
rise in numbers of bribe takers, perhaps corruption now plays a more important role more 
than ever in affecting economic efficiency and development in Indonesia.192 Nevertheless, 
even though decentralization came with its disadvantages, it is not an argument against 
democratization. On the contrary, it suggests the imperative need to focus on improving good 
governance at the district level and building credible institutions that would strengthen the 
checks and balances mechanism.193 
Implications on Indonesia’s Socio-Development Aspect 
 The need to study changes in corruption levels and socio-political incentives in post-
Suharto Indonesia is because it is linked to the socio-economic development and welfare of 
the people. There is nothing benevolent about corruption as it is a form of misallocated 
resources that are not going towards the betterment of the people’s welfare. Studies have also 
shown that corruption is one of the main causes of the low growth rates of developing 
countries.194 Perhaps, this has to do with the change in the nature of corruption, as the 
coordination amongst Suharto’s close alliances minimized transaction and political cost, but 
with the end of those alliances, came more tiers of bureaucracy and administrative cost that 
hampered investment and economic productivity.195  
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 Looking at the socio-economic development variables, Indonesia’s performance in 
the decade between 1998 and 2008 was reasonably good relative to other emerging market 
democracies around the world, especially given that it had just been severely hit by the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.196 It maintained a 4.8% GDP growth rate – comparable to its 
East Asian counterparts – and a rising annual population growth rate and adult literacy 
rate.197 But if the people do not think these variables are improving fast enough or if it fails to 
deliver actual change in the local districts, the people’s trust in democracy will start to 
wane.198 
 Nonetheless, it is rather ironic that one of the two main reasons for decentralization 
was to see improvements in socio-economic developments, yet due to poor implementation; 
decentralization has not shown to be the better alternative in this manner. In line with the 
findings of the study by Dr. Krisztina Kis-Katos and Dr. Günther Schulze about 
administrative overspending in the local districts, Dr. Alexander Freire, professor of 
sociology of education at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, also noted that upon closer 
investigation at the regional budget distribution, it is apparent that health and education 
received very little attention.199 This result goes to show that hasty decentralization could 
bring in more disadvantages and make the effectiveness of public service delivery more 
ambiguous.200 
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Difficulties in measuring corruption  
Despite the creation of independent institutions designed to monitor and track the 
levels of corruption, it is still an elusive factor that is hard to measure and observe. By nature, 
corruption is hard to grasp conceptually and even more difficult to measure empirically.201 
Most of the measurements available today look at perceptions of corruption, which is 
something that could be affected by various other uncontrollable factors. Corruption is 
multidimensional, yet current measurements to understand corruption levels are typically 
limited to one specific activity. Beyond that, it is sometimes also hard to agree on one 
definition of corruption, and the legality of certain acts could also be questionable at times.202 
Corruption is also a very context specific issue, and theories about corruption cannot 
necessarily be applied universally.203 Yet, even though measuring corruption is challenging, 
especially because these activities are done in secret and illegally, it is still a worthwhile 
cause to assess the magnitude and consequences of it and come up with the appropriate 
responses.  
 
Other Factors Affecting the Government’s Ability to Deliver on Public Services 
 Finally, while corruption plays an important part in the government’s ability to deliver 
public services, there are also other factors besides corruption that also come into play. First 
of all, there is the scale of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 that hampered the ability 
of Indonesia to recover and show high growth as the country faced more uncertainty, higher 
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reliable wealth defense and lower rates of investment.204 The financial crisis also led to a 
change in political system, and adjusting to a new political structure requires time.  
In addition, historical and legacies of previous regimes should also be taken into 
consideration because they play a role in shaping the political contours of Indonesia. 
Corruption and collusion were also serious problems during Dutch colonial times, and these 
issues were exacerbated during Suharto’s presidency. Jeffrey Winters noted a very important 
point saying that, “In fact, it is misguided to suggest that democracy is to blame for slower 
growth rates since the inception of Reformasi. If anything, Indonesia’s democracy works 
remarkably well considering the political damage inflicted on the body politic for a decade by 
Sukarno and then for three decades by Suharto.205” The fall of Suharto also led to the slowing 
down of the economy because his business partners had to pull all of their investment out, 
which led to a domestic investment void in the economy.206  
 
Implications for Reforms 
While the nominal change in corruption levels in Indonesia between the New Order 
and the Reformasi era is still widely debated, there is a clear need to reform several aspects of 
the government, and this paper seeks to bring to light some policy implications. Firstly, there 
is a need to increase the level of political competitiveness at the local level. Dr. Krisztina Kis-
Katos and Dr. Günther Schulze commented that, “More transparency of, and higher 
competition in the political process as well as lower barriers to entry in the political market 
may be important elements for improving the formal accountability mechanism.207” Higher 
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budget transparency and more competitive press would also help in reducing misallocation of 
resources by the local governments.  
In addition, another crucial reform is needed in the area of low pay in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy. Ambassador Linggawaty Hakim poignantly points out that one of the root 
causes for corruption that gives people incentives to do so is the inadequate salary system that 
affects their own welfare. As long as the state is unable to give them adequate welfare, 
corruption will continue to spread because civil servants, given the opportunity, would seize 
it for their own good.208 Another reason for the increase in wages is also to make the public 
sector more competitive, because the state currently loses many great talents to the private 
sector, who is able to provide them with a higher salary. By keeping the salary low, the 
government can only be filled by public servants who are unable to compete in the private 
sector.209 Following this, there is also the need to also have a budget reform to use the state 
expenses more efficiently. There is a misconception that state expenses should be cut to be 
more efficient, but efficiency requires money.210 Currently, the central government is on the 
right track as they are looking to reduce fuel subsidies to make room in their national budget 
for other development issues. Even though this is a painful thing for a country to have to go 
through in the short run, it will hopefully bear fruit in the future.211  
Moreover, to curb the problem of corruption at the local level, the central government 
should strengthen its regulations and create more monitoring systems. If possible, it should 
also increase public party financing, so that parties are less incentivized to look for private 
donors – an area which is often susceptible to nepotism and bribery.212 Bureaucratic reforms 
should also include minimizing interactions with bureaucrats and creating simpler and fewer 
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regulations. The central government should also look into enhancing the role of civil society 
groups in the country so that they could act as an anchor to the power of the oligarchs. So 
long as the social order of the previous regime remains in place, cries of reforms from 
progressive liberals in the country will continue to be stifled.213  
Finally, one of the most important, if not the most important factor, is the need to 
reform the judicial system. Amongst many, it needs to repeal legal impediments to freedom 
of expression, reinstall oversight powers of the Judicial Commission to combat judicial 
corruption and reduce subnational executive interference and strengthen law enforcements in 
the country.214 
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III. CONCLUSION  
Conclusion 
“Power tends to corrupt,” and with the empowerment of 473s local bureaucrats and 
more local parliament members, came more opportunities for these government officials to 
abuse their power. By looking at the changes in incentive structure, this paper has sought to 
measure changes in corruption from more of a qualitative perspective and succinctly analyze 
how changes in political institutions and legal structure make it more likely for actors to act 
in one way or another. While Indonesia has been classified as an electoral democracy and has 
passed a key litmus test on democratic consolidation215, it still has a long way to go in terms 
of achieving the title of a liberal democracy. We have to look past just the institutions 
created, but understand that states do not operate on a blank state, but stand on contours that 
have been slowly growing. In the words of Dr. Christian von Lübke, “Roads are important, 
but what it stands on, is more important.216”  
Democratization and decentralization in Indonesia did not lead to disintegration – as 
was feared by leaders at the time – yet, the quality of local government and public service 
delivery has not necessarily improved across the archipelago.217  Despite the creation of 
democratic institutions making it easier to reduce corruption, decentralization has led to more 
corruption at the local level and it has not been conducive to higher socio-economic 
development. Decentralization may not necessarily yield the results that progressive liberals 
had initially expected, but given the context that it was operating in, it has started to build 
more credible political institutions to reduce corruption and ensure that no one interest is 
powerful enough to shape the course of the country’s politics and economic trajectory. The 
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result of the study is not an argument against democracy; rather, it is an argument in favor of 
maximizing democracy’s potential to deliver higher socio-economic development by 
focusing on the implementation at the local level.218  
To do this, Indonesia needs a stronger civil society and press, and a more open and 
competitive political system at the local level. Rome was not built in a weak, and the creation 
of inclusive institutions that will lead to reduction in corruption levels should continue to be 
on Indonesia’s top agenda in the coming years. Given the multidimensional issue of 
corruption, it is not the sole responsibility of the Corruption Eradication Committee to solve 
the problem of corruption, but it calls upon the government, civil society groups and the 
people to solve the issue comprehensively. While the results of decentralization have not 
done justice to its goal of improving public service delivery in Indonesia; with the 
improvements of accountability, transparency and checks and balances mechanism at the 
local level, the dream of achieving higher socio-economic development will become a reality. 
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